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
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THEESIS

THE INFLUENCE OF ISLAM OF TURKEY

by

Terry Edwin Rutledge

Mar 1981

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The Influence of Islam in Turkey

by

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Major, United States Army
B.A., Arkansas Polytechnic College, 1969


Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

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from the

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ABSTRACT

This thesis explores the influence of Islam in Turkey today. Dealing primarily with Republican Turkey, the influence of Islam is traced through the development of the various Turkish constitutions, through a brief study of the political elite structure, and finally by looking at the individual Turk.

Although Islam is being seen as slowly being eroded by 'secularization-by-modernization,' it is still seen as a very strong, if subtle, force in the Turkish social fabric.

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NOTES ON LANGUAGE AND TRANSLITERATION

In the interest of simplicity, use of transliteration has been generally limited to proper names, except in cases where a work or phrase of Ottoman Turkish or Arabic has special meaning. In these instances, the transliteration is used as found in the source material.

Additionally, different translators from different periods have found rather diverse spellings of standard terms to their liking. In these cases, too, quotes use spellings as found in the source, while the general text of the paper uses whatever seems to be in most common usage today. Examples would be: for Islamic holy law, Shari'a, Sheri, Sheri-eh, Sheriah, and Cheri; or for the Ottoman Sultan, Abdulhamid, Abdulhamit, and Abdul Hamid.

Another problem arises with *öz Türkç*--the new 'pure' Turkish written in the Latin alphabet. Generally, the letters are pronounced in similar fashion to English with these major exceptions:

c = j as in John
ç = ch as in church
ğ = soft g, similar to running together the words 'I am'
ö = the German ö in öftnen
ş = sh as in short
ü = u in French tu or ü in German shützen
i = varies from i in machine to u in radium
(Turkish has two separate i's--one dotted and one undotted. In this paper, all i's will be dotted for simplicity.)

I. INTRODUCTION

From its beginnings, Islam has represented a comprehensive attempt to fully integrate every aspect of society--from government to hygiene--into the realm of religion. The drift away from Islam in governmental affairs began quite soon and has continued at varied rates in most of Islamic world until the present day. More recently, however, an upsurge of Islamic fundamentalism has been seen leading countries such as Libya and Pakistan, and of course Iran, to dramatic changes in their governments and a general re-thinking of their positions relative to other Islamic nations as well as the world at large.

Osman I (1280-1324) founded the Ottoman Empire as a gazi, or fighter for the faith of Islam. During the early years of the empire, this spirit prevailed enabling the House of Osman eventually to subdue the infidels up to the very gates of Vienna. This rather aggressive brand of Islam enabled the Ottomans to achieve a firm hold over the settled Arab portions of the Middle East and gave them an excellent claim to the Caliphate.

Although the position of the Sultan-Caliph as both head-of-state and the chief officer of the faith technically made the empire a theocracy, piety was not able to prevent decadence in large measure and Islam eventually came to be more

a means of keeping Muslim subjects in line than a governmental and social philosophy.

Arguments have been made in nearly all the Islamic nations where an Islamic revival has been proposed that the end of greatness coincided with a decline in piety. This argument has been made in Turkey, as well.

Atatürk, on the other hand, saw Islam as an unproductive relic of a bygone age and, as one of his earliest reforms, he abolished the Caliphate (3 March 1924). This, coupled with his numerous other secularizing reforms, served to set Republican Turkey firmly on the path of Westernization.

During the early period of Westernization/modernization, progress was understandably slow due to the world-wide depression and the Second World War. Because the spirit of the reforms had oftentimes reached beyond the public sector only superficially and because, as is often the case, crises often prompt people to turn to spiritual concerns, there was a popular outcry for lessening of state restrictions on religion. To some extent, this was done by both the Republican People's Party (RPP) and the Democratic Party (DP).

The economic success of the 1950's brought about by a combination of Marshall Plan economic aid, membership in NATO, and the general world-wide post-war boom served to increase the pace of modernization and its bedfellows urbanization and secularization. Like all good things, however, this prosperity proved fleeting.

In most of the world the decades of the 1960's and 1970's have brought unrest and some instability. In Turkey there have been crises.

The first came in 1960 when DP excesses proved too much for the old elites and brought forth a military coup to protect Atatürk's reforms. The second was Cyprus.

Turkey's problems with Greece over Cyprus were bad enough, but when compounded by Western unwillingness to understand the Turkish viewpoint they multiplied. The 'Johnson Letter' (1964), an ill-advised and poorly worded slap-in-the-face for a faithful ally, marked a starting point from which relations with the West began to be seriously questioned. Following this by ten years, the arms embargo served to further cool Turkish relations with the West.

Nearly simultaneously, the Arab oil embargo occurred. Coupled with spiraling prices, this caused what may prove to be irreparable damage to the Turkish economy. In addition to the direct effect on the balance of trade, the embargo--through its equal effect in Western Europe--caused Turkish gästarbeiteren to find themselves unemployed and forced to return home.

All these problems served to emphasize the questionable value of close alignment with the West and western methods, and to heighten the sense of unrest among the populace at large.

Again, crisis prompted some to seek solace from a higher authority. Politicians, using religion as a vehicle for gaining votes, openly pandered to the still largely unsecularized populace--especially in rural areas. The National Salvation Party (NSP) is a prime example of this. This sudden interest in Islam differed from any previous ones during the republic in that even government officials jumped on the bandwagon hoping to gain mileage with their long-lost Islamic (read: 'oil-producing') brethren, as well as with the rural voter. Despite the outward appearance of use of religion solely for domestic and foreign political gain, the response of the voters to these ploys must be considered evidence of some popular chord being struck.

The question then of this paper is: "Is Islam an influence in Turkey today?" By tracing historical development in the form of law, elite growth and attitudes, political parties and elections, and the sociological aspects of everyday life, Islam will indeed be shown to be a force in Turkey after more than fifty years of secular reform and westernization.

Islam is seen as a power by the public officials who co-opt it and by the politicians who attempt to exploit it. More important, Islam is an inborn part of every Muslim Turk whose parents, grandparents, etc. for nearly a thousand years have been taught that Islam is a way--the way-- of life.

II. CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN TURKEY

It is fitting for even a brief study of a nation's political life to begin with the law of the land. With the brief exception of the first period of the Ottoman Constitution (1876-1878), until 1908 the alleged basis for government in Ottoman Turkey was the Shari'a. In that year (1908), Sultan Abdulhamid II, in response to pressure from the Young Turks, restored the constitution which he had earlier suspended.

The next in the line of Turkish constitutions was a brief and extremely general document dated 20 January 1921. This was followed in turn on 20 April 1924 with the "Constitution of the Republic of Turkey". This constitution was amended on four occasions to incorporate the expanded realm of Kemalist reforms and ultimately was rewritten in 1945 to incorporate those amendments as well as the Latinized alphabet by then in widespread use--at least officially--throughout the country.

Presently, "The Constitution of the Turkish Republic", promulgated on 9 July 1961, is the basic law of the land. In the following pages, points of continuity and change in the development of the concept of constitutional government in Turkey from the Shari'a to the present will be briefly explored--with a special eye toward the impact of Islam upon that development.

A. CONCEPT OF GOVERNMENT

The concept of government in Turkey is that of a highly centralized entity manipulating the many-lengthed strings required to control the day-to-day functions of the state in all its aspects. This is nearly as true under the Constitution of 1961 as it was under Abdul Hamid II or Selim III. This concept of a strong central government has pervaded the development of government-by-law in Turkey since pre-Tanzimat times and has been strongly influenced by the nation's Islamic heritage. According to Kemal Karpat:

The Ottoman concepts of government and authority, strongly influenced by classical Islamic thought, had been devised in conformity with the requirements of power. The Ottoman rulers seemed to have a realistic understanding of power and of the role of human groups. The Muslim citizen was loyal to the state for it was synonymous with his faith...Throughout the reformist era, beginning with Selim III and ending with Atatürk, governments in Turkey were extremely careful not to tamper with those essential bonds which tied the Muslim citizen to the state.¹

One example of this tendency to centralized control is found in the area of vilayet (provincial) administration. By 1808, provincial notables had achieved sufficient prominence that one of their number, Bayraktar Mustafa Paşa, had become the first of them to ascend to the position of Grand Vizir. He, realizing the possible destabilizing effect of effect of these powerful forces in the hinterlands, attempted

¹Kemal H. Karpat, ed., Social Change and Politics in Turkey: A Structural-Historical Analysis (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1973), p. 326.

to promulgate the Sened-i-Ittifak (Document of Agreement). Under this document, the Sultan would have granted a certain degree of autonomy to the provincial notables, and they in return would have pledged allegiance to him. Due to the reluctance of either side to yield portions of their power or privileges, the agreement went unsigned; but it does represent the first formal document whereby the Sultan attempted to gain control over the provinces.²

As time progressed, so did attempts at central government control in the provinces. In 1864, a new Vilayet Law was promulgated providing a quasi-representative form of government; but it should be noted, the Vali (governor) and numerous other provincial and local officials were appointed by the central government.³ As the effects of this law

² For divergent views on the value of Sened-i-Ittifak, Cf Suna Kili, Turkish Constitutional Developments and Assembly Debates on the Constitutions of 1924 and 1961 (Istanbul: Robert College Research Center, 1971), p. 12; and Stanford J. Shaw and Ezel Kural Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey, vol. 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), p. 2.

³ Bernard Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey, 2nd ed. (London: Oxford University Press, 1968, 1968), p. 388.

became more widespread, local autonomy in the less remote parts of the empire came virtually to an end.⁴

Revised Vilayet laws came into being in 1913 and under the republic in 1929. These promoted the dual nature of local and provincial government as being part of the national governmental apparatus and as exercising local autonomy in some areas. In practice, however, it seems that the major officials are still appointed by Ankara (the 1929 law is still in effect) and the purse strings are controlled from there as well--there is still no ability to levy taxes below the national level.⁵

⁴One interesting aspect of this and other Vilayet laws in the Ottoman Empire during the last half of the nineteenth century is the composition of the various councils and assemblies provided for. Muftis and other Shari'a personnel were to be found as ex officio members at every level. Likewise, religious chiefs of the other communities were included. In fact, in the annual General Provincial Assembly, each Sanjak (major sub-division of a Vilayet) was represented by two Muslims and two non-Muslims--a policy which would seem guaranteed to provide a measure of over-representation to non-Muslims in the Muslim provinces if the system worked in the outwardly democratic form as published. Additionally, at no point were the local governments below ministry level permitted to tax or otherwise control the church or its property--nor for that matter were they allowed to tax any other aspect of their administrative area. Iraq, Ministry of Justice, Translations of the Ottoman Constitutional Laws, the Vilayet Administrative Law, the Municipal Law and Various Other Laws (1921), pp. 35-48; and Lewis, Emergence, p. 388.

⁵Kili, Turkish Constitutional Developments, pp. 13-60; and Lewis, Emergence, pp. 391-392.

Equally an agent of control was the Village Law (Köy Kanunu) of 8 March 1924 which through the extension of administrative requirements enabled the central government to impose itself even further on rural areas. This law set many goals, but, by leaving their financial and technical development to the villagers themselves, guaranteed limited implementation while still expanding bureaucratic control from Ankara.⁶

In these laws there is some degree of autonomy for local government, but in practice there is very little basic difference from ancient Islamic codes which failed to recognize any measurable degree of local autonomy.⁷

B. FORM OF GOVERNMENT

With a propensity to strong central government, it would seem reasonable to expect the founding fathers of republican Turkey to opt for a constitutional monarchy as more readily adaptable to their present needs and past experiences. As Bernard Lewis reminds us, the end of the First World War saw the great monarchies in ruin while the long established republics of the United States and France were strong and

⁶ Joseph S. Szyliowicz, Political Change in Rural Turkey: ERDEMELI (The Hague: Mouton & Co., 1966), p. 38.

⁷ Lewis, Emergence, p. 393.

victorious.⁸ This lesson was not lost on Turkish elite of the day. Probably of equal importance were the memories of Sultan Abdul Hamid II and the Young Turks' dictatorial regime, which promised dire consequences if the monarchy was restored. Still another factor to be considered in this vein was that the government of the Grand National Assembly had led the Turkish Revolution--not been formed as a result of it. This seemed to put government in a more positive light than in many Western post-revolutionary states where government was often considered a 'necessary evil'.⁹

C. DISTRIBUTION OF POWER

After the decision was made that the new Turkish government's form would be that of a republic, the next question to be addressed was that of separation of powers--or more specifically in the Turkish case, where in the government the power would reside. The seat of power had been shifted from time to time during the period of the empire and the most recent of these shifts gave cause for concern to the framers of the new constitution.

⁸ Ibid., p. 369

⁹ Killi, Turkish Constitutional Developments, p. 61. Some authors feel the Quran (42:38) "...affairs are (decided by) council among themselves..." is a basic exhortation to Muslims to pursue a democratic form of government. Maulana Muhammad Ali, translator and commentator, The Holy Qur'an, 6th ed. (Chicago: Specialty Promotion Co., 1973).

Toward the end of the eighteenth century, Selim III (1789-1807) began the restoration of the power of the sovereign. He, Mahmud II (1808-1839) and Abdulaziz (1861-1876) all ruled more or less along the lines of Europe's enlightened despots. In addition to these Sultans, there was also Abdülmecid (1839-1861), during whose reign the Tanzimat reforms gained their main impetus--chiefly under the guidance of his Grand Vizir, Mustafa Reşit Paşa, who held the most powerful position in the empire intermittently from 1837-1858. During this period various reforms were undertaken, usually to either placate or imitate the European powers. Although these reforms (culminating in the Ottoman Constitution of 1876) outwardly provided increased individual freedoms for the populace, they also served to centralize governmental functions, reconfirm the ascendant position of the Sultan, and thus increase central power at the expense of reduced local autonomy in the provinces.¹⁰

The Ottoman Constitution made provision for a bicameral legislature (Art 42), the sessions of which could be shortened, prolonged, or terminated at the Sultan's will (Arts 44 and 73). Members of the Senate were named by the Sultan (Art 61) and for a law to be passed required a majority in both chambers (Art 55). The Ministries, heads of which were appointed by

¹⁰For a more thorough discussion of the Tanzimat period and attendant reforms, Cf Shaw and Shaw, History, pp. 1-167; and Lewis, Emergence, pp. 74-128 *passim*.

the Sultan (Art 27), possessed the sole initiative for proposing new laws or modification of old ones (Art 53).

Obviously, the Sultan was in firm control. As was stated in Article Three of the Constitution:

The Ottoman sovereignty which is united in the person of the sovereign of the supreme Kalifat of Islam belongs to the eldest of the princes of the dynasty of Osman conformably to the rules established ab antique.¹¹

As is clear from these and the remainder of the 119 articles of this constitution, there was very little attenuation of the power of the sovereign during the reform period. Rather, it actually culminated in a written reaffirmation of that power to a degree in excess of that enjoyed by Ottoman Sultans for over two hundred years.¹²

Later (1876-1909), Abdulhamid II took the reinforced personal rule of his predecessors and expanded it into an absolute monarchy of the most repressive kind. His actions after suspension of the constitution are well documented elsewhere, but suffice it to say here this repression was one of the chief catalysts for the revolution of the Young Turks in 1908.

The Young Turks immediately set about to restore the constitution--supplementing personal liberties as they did

¹¹"The Ottoman Constitution, Promulgated the 7th Zilbridge, 1293 (11/23 Dec. 1876)" American Journal of International Law, vol. 12, supp. no. 2, (Oct. 1908), pp. 367-387.

¹²Ibid.

so--and sharply curtailing the powers of the Sultan. As they succeeded in expanding their control over the office of the Sultanate (by now held by Mehmet V Reşad), they came to see a powerful executive as being in their best interests. By 1916, the Sultan's powers (as exercised by the Young Turk leaders, Cemal, Enver, and Talat Paşa) had been re-expanded and were once again considerable.¹³

Thus, by the time the Turks were ready to consider change to a republic, the country had been successively subjected to increasingly powerful despots, a repressive absolute monarch, and a dictatorial triumvirate--all exercising control from the executive. It is not surprising, therefore, that the Constitution of 1921 (Law of Fundamental Organization) stated:

Executive power and legislative authority are manifested and concentrated in the Grand National Assembly, which is the sole and rightful representative of the nation.¹⁴

Additionally, this document began with the statement: "Sovereignty belongs unconditionally to the nation."¹⁵ Although there may well have been little thought by many of the delegates to the Grand National Assembly given to the

¹³ Lewis, Emergence, pp. 363-364.

¹⁴ Kili, Turkish Constitutional Developments, Art. 2, p. 160.

¹⁵ Ibid., Art. 1, p. 160.

framing of a new constitution,¹⁶ these first two articles delineate a clear break with the past. In 1924, after the Kemalists had managed to consolidate their hold on the nation, a constituent assembly met for the express purpose of framing a new constitution.

The resulting document severely limited the powers of the executive branch of the new unicameral parliamentary government. Despite these restrictions, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, from the supposedly weak office of President, managed to exercise near-dictatorial powers until his death in 1938. Following Atatürk, İsmet İnönü continued his predecessor's strong presidency--especially during the crisis years of the Second World War. The chief vehicle for this dominance was the party structure of the Republican People's Party (RPP), which was virtually the only party for the first twenty-two years of the Republic.¹⁷

In 1946, however, an unusual event for a relatively undeveloped country with a government of military background occurred. The RPP allowed the formation of opposition parties and subsequently, in 1950, allowed itself to be peacefully voted out of office. The ensuing advent of the Democratic Party brought to light a basic inherent weakness in the concept of the all-powerful legislative branch.

¹⁶ Lewis, Emergence, p. 366.

¹⁷ Ibid., pp. 370-371.

The Democratic Party (DP) managed, through adroit manipulation of the Parliament, to dominate the Turkish polity from 1950 until the military takeover in 1960. During this period, aided by an overwhelming majority in the Grand National Assembly, they amended the Electoral Law in 1951 and 1957 in such a manner as to ensure their continued domination of the government well into the future; but probably their most heinous crime in the eyes of the old Kemalist modernist elite was their regression from Kemalist principles (ie: concessions to traditionalist and other groups in Turkish society serving to retard or reverse modernization).

This prompted the Turkish Revolution of 27 May 1960.¹⁸

If the voluntary relinquishment of power in 1950 was uncharacteristic of a developing nation, the military coup of 1960 was even more so. The coup was engineered by a group of thirty-eight officers who constituted the Committee of National Unity (CNU) headed by General Cemal Gürsel.¹⁹ The unusual aspect of this coup was the goal of the CNU to return the government to civilian control as soon as was possible. Indicative of this aim was the establishment on the very first day of the revolution of a commission to

¹⁸ Kili, Turkish Constitutional Developments, p. 22-23.

¹⁹ Metin Tamkoç, The Warrior Diplomats: Guardians of the National Security and Modernization of Turkey (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 1976), p. 42.

prepare a draft for a new constitution.²⁰ As soon as it could be drafted, approved, and ratified by the people, the CNU did, in fact, return the reigns of government to civilian control.

The process of drafting, revising and gaining final approval from the constituent assembly took precisely one year (27 May 1960 to 27 May 1961). After this, it was submitted to the voting public who approved it (by a narrow margin, considering the circumstances); and on 20 July 1961, the "Constitution of the Turkish Republic" became the law of the land.²¹

Key elements in the new constitution were those which modified somewhat the distribution of powers within the new government. The legislature was still by far the most powerful entity, but now there were to be two chambers 'with different powers and terms of office...' There were to be judicial guarantees and control for elections and the position of the President was enhanced slightly.²² Basically, however, the powers of the chief executive were still

²⁰ Kili, Turkish Constitutional Developments, pp. 13-65. For the composition of this commission, See Appendix A of this paper.

²¹ Of the eligible voters, only 49.8% voted for approval which shows a remarkable degree of dissent considering the only way to get rid of the CNU was by approval. See Appendix A for complete statistics on the votes.

²² Kili, Turkish Constitutional Developments, pp. 68-69.

severely limited; and in line with the traditional power structure of a parliamentary form of government, the most powerful office in the land became that of the Prime Minister.

That the legislative branch of the government was intended to remain the most powerful is certainly obvious in the new document. The President is elected for a single term from among the members of the Grand National Assembly (Art 95). He then designates a Prime Minister from the same body which has the right to accept or reject him. The Council of Ministers was originally intended to come also from this body, but debate over this subject resulted in the appointment of non-members being acceptable (Art 102). The Assembly, of course, was given the option of a vote of no confidence at any time, enabling it to eject an unpopular government government. The President was given the authority to call for new elections (Art 108) after three votes of no confidence--virtually his only power not strictly controlled by the Assembly.²³ Senate actions also are dictated by the Assembly. For example, if the Assembly rejects a bill the Senate has approved, it is void. If, on the other hand, the Senate rejects a bill already approved by the Assembly, it goes to the committee. Also, length of debate on a bill

²³ Ibid., pp. 128-129 and Appendix D.

in the Senate is determined by the period used for debate on the same bill by the Assembly (Art 92).²⁴

The Constitutional Court whose duty is to "review the constitutionality of laws and By-laws of the Turkish Grand National Assembly" (Art 146) is composed of fifteen members chosen by and representing the military, universities, Grand National Assembly, Council of State, Courts of Accounts, and Courts of Cassation. Although the Constitution charges this Court with duties reading much the same as the U.S. Supreme Court, it is interesting to note that the term is not for life, and almost the only groups who are allowed to initiate proceedings are the ones who appoint the members. Considering the diversity of the representation and ability of these groups to remove and replace members almost at will, it would seem safe to assume the functioning of the court suffers from the same problems as the parliament--namely a requirement for coalition formation to reach a decision. (Arts 145-152).²⁵

This then has been the evolution of the basic form of the Turkish government since the beginning of the nineteenth century: ever-increasing power accruing to the chief executive, culminating in the repression of Abdul Hamid II and dictatorship of the Young Turks; change to a Republic

²⁴ Ibid., pp. 187-188.

²⁵ Ibid., pp. 199-201.

with an all-powerful legislature which at first yielded its power to Atatürk and later to İnönü; followed by peaceful conversion to a true multi-party system which saw the legislature's power abused by the Democratic Party. This resulted in the military takeover in 1960 and the subsequent promulgation of the country's present constitution--again giving the vast bulk of political power to the elected Grand National Assembly.

D. RELIGIOUS INFLUENCE

While questions of the form of government and distribution of power were of obvious and immediate importance from the Tanzimat period onward, another question of near equal standing to successive would-be reformers was that of the status of religion and its relationship to the state.

The beginnings of the move away from an Islamic state could be traced to Mustafa Kemal Atatürk in the 1920's, or to the Hatt-i Serif of Gülhane in 1839, or to the introduction of the first printing press into Constantinople in 1727, or even to the Umayyaids of the seventh and eighth centuries. Whatever origins one gives this movement, one fact rings clear--the move away from strict adherence to Islam in affairs of state has had a good bit of time to bear fruit.

The problem has been one of projecting a national identity to the people so as to provide them with an alternative concept to which to cling and to ultimately replace

their religion--not as a value system, but rather as a source of a more localized identity. By 1961, Cemal Cürsel, as a part of the constitutional debates, was prompted to say:

Go to a village in Anatolia and ask a villager 'Who are you?' His answer will be, 'Thank God, I am a Moslem.' He does not say, 'I am Turkish.' This consciousness has not yet been awakened.²⁶

The problem faced by any Turkish government in attempting reforms is one of history. By 661, much of what is now Eastern Turkey was under Muslim rule. Consequently, in those areas, government programs face thirteen centuries of local Islamic traditions. It must also be recalled that portions of Eastern Turkey were only nominally under central Ottoman control--even into the nineteenth century--so in those regions, such reforms as were attempted had little effect.

The Shari'a is not a formally codified law, but rather an amorphous mass of opinion rendered by jurists, often based on local conditions and nominally on the teachings of one of the great juristic schools (in Turkey, that of Abu Hanifa).²⁷ Max Weber said of the Shari'a:

The sacred law could not be disregarded; nor could it, despite many adaptations, be really carried out in practice...opinions (of the Sheik-ul-Islam and his subordinate muftis) like the opinions of oracles...

²⁶ Ibid., p. 90.

²⁷ Niyazi Berkes, "Historical Background of Turkish Secularism" in Richard N. Frye, ed., Islam and the West (S'Gravenhage: Mouton & Co., 1957), p. 47.

are given without any statement of rational reasons. Thus, they actually increase the irrationality of the sacred law rather than contribute, however slightly, to its rationalization.²⁸

He also states that secular courts' jurisdiction had been brought to prevail in all matters except "...tutelage, marriage, inheritance, divorce, and to some extent, settled lands and certain other aspects of land law"--this as early as the Umayyad Dynasty.²⁹ In other words, by the time of even the early Ottoman Empire, Shari'a courts had come to function in a restricted range of civil matters only; the exigencies of government having overcome the inflexibility of Islamic law.

Why then did the Ottomans (and others) insist on at least paying lip service to the Shari'a? The Tanzimat reforms addressed many topics; but so long as the Sultan's sovereignty derived from God alone, he could selectively ignore them with virtual immunity. Islamic teachings certainly supported this position with statements such as: "man ishtaddat wat'atuhu wajabat ta'atuhu" (Whose power prevails must be obeyed).³⁰ With such a base of support,

²⁸ Max Weber, Economy and Society: an Outline of Interpretive Sociology, vol. 2, ed. Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich (New York: Bedminster Press, 1968), p. 821.

²⁹ Ibid., p. 822.

³⁰ Bernard Lewis, Islam in History: Ideas, Men and Events in the Middle East (New York: The Library Press, 1973), p. 296. Cf also "obey...those in authority from among you" (The Holy Qur'an 4:59) and "He who dislikes an order from his amir should withhold himself from opposition." (Maulana Muhammad Ali, A Manual of Hadith, xxxi:3 and xxi:6, [Lahore: The Ahmadiyya Anjuman Ishaat Islam]).

it is easy to understand a reluctance on the part of the Ottomans toward change.

The Ottoman Constitution institutionalized the position of the Sultan, not only as the supreme sovereign, as mentioned above, but also as a sacred personage.

His majesty the Sultan is irresponsible;
His person is sacred. (Article 5)

Further, the constitution in fact required the allegiance of all Muslims (not just Ottoman subjects) to "the supreme Kalifat of Islam" (Art 3) and "the protector of the Mussulman religion" (Art 4).

There was, however, in this constitution what was possibly the first officially stated deviation from Islamic law in Articles 81 through 91, dealing with the judiciary.³¹ In these articles, criminal and civil courts are clearly given authority over those responsible for Shari'a matters. This, of course, is reasonable if one considers the fact that the mere existence of a constitution served to replace the Shari'a as the basic law of the land.

The Constitution of 1921 (Law of Fundamental Organization), composed in mid-war, did not address religion, but its successor document was more complete. Article Two of the Constitution of the Republic of Turkey (1924) provides

³¹"The Ottoman Constitution", pp. 367-387.

a revealing chronology of the status of Islam in Republican Turkey:

The Religion of the Turkish State is Islam; the Official language is Turkish; the seat of government is Angora. (Original version, 20 April 1924)

The official language of the Turkish State is Turkish; its seat is the city of Ankara. (As amended 10 April 1928)

The Turkish State is republican, nationalist, populist, etatist, laique, and revolutionist. The official language of the State is Turkish, its capital is the city of Ankara. (Final form, 5 February 1937)³²

From these and other minor changes such as amending the oath of office to delete reference to Allah, one can gain an insight into the progress of Ataturk's campaign to disestablish Islam in the public sphere. These minor constitutional changes are only manifestations of the eight principle reform laws of the Ataturk era:

1. The Law on the unification of education, 3 March 1924
2. The Hat Law, 25 Nov 1925
3. The Law on closing down of dervish convents and mausoleums, etc., 30 Nov 1925
4. The conduct of the act of marriage according to article 110 of the Civil Code, 17 Feb 1926
5. The Law concerning the adoption of international numerals, 20 May 1928
6. The Law concerning the adoption and application of the Turkish alphabet, 1 Nov 1928
7. The Law on the abolition of titles and appellations, 26 Nov 1934

³² Donald Everett Webster, The Turkey of Ataturk (Philadelphia: The American Academy of Political and Social Science, 1939, 1939), Appendix D.

8. The Law concerning the prohibition to wear certain garments, 3 Dec 1934³³

All of these laws were legislated in order to reduce the hold of Islam over the Turkish state and people. The first was intended to put religious schools (medrese) out of business. The second and eighth dealt with garments associated with Islam (prayer in which the forehead must touch the ground is very difficult in a hat with a brim). The third outlawed the historically fanatical religious sects which had caused problems for centuries. The change of alphabet and numerals served to slowly sever Turkish ties with the Arab-Islamic world. Marriage became a civil rather than religious affair. In general, these reform laws were designed to vastly reduce the hold of Islam over future generations of Turks and to immediately end religious power in the government.³⁴

Frederick W. Frey in The Turkish Political Elite says the Kemalist elite of the early years of the Republic saw the religious ranks as "Public Enemy Number One"--the harbinger of their most formidable opposition. From the draft of the new constitution in 1961, one can readily deduce that the status of religion as a major concern was still prominent.

³³ Kili, Turkish Constitutional Developments, pp. 201-202.

³⁴ Lewis, Emergence, pp. 401-436; and Shaw and Shaw, History, pp. 384-388. One small item of some incongruity is that although Article 2 established the state religion, the Caliphate had been terminated seven weeks earlier.

Before debate on specific articles was opened in the Constituent Assembly (1961), the floor was opened for general comments. One of the most frequently discussed topics was the need for accurate definition and protection of secularism.

Several of the participants felt secularism was indispensable for the protection of Kemalist reforms, and that secularism, in turn "...needed constitutional protection because of the occasional eruption of reaction in the country..."³⁵ This would seem to indicate that forty years was insufficient time to change the minds of all the people.

Article 19 (reprinted in its final form at Appendix B) discussed "Freedom of Thought and Faith", and provoked one of the longest debates on any single article. It is in two parts--the first guaranteeing freedom of religious belief, and the second prohibiting exploitation of religion for "political or personal benefit".

As innocuous as these concepts may seem, the uproar was significant.³⁶ Much of the debate was centered around the need for state control religion with representatives both

³⁵Kili, Turkish Constitutional Developments, p. 82.

³⁶For a detailed account of the debate on Article 19, see Kili, Turkish Constitutional Developments, pp. 98-104, from which this section was derived.

pro and con. Republican Peasant Nation Party (RPNP, generally considered somewhat right of center politically) representatives were mostly in favor of relaxed state control over religion, using the argument of Western secularism wherein state and religion are totally separated.

The other side of the argument had supporters from across the political spectrum. Because the Constitutional Commission felt Islam had been a hinderance to reforms and development, they felt the state must be in a position to put restraints on it. This was considered essential to promote the rule of law and--especially among the rural masses--to bolster a feeling of Turkish nationalism where there still was none.³⁷

Enver Ziya Karal (Chairman of the Commission) is reported to have said:

that Islam was not only a system of belief but also a political ideology, and that nationalism replaced the political ideology of Islam through the principles and reforms of Kemal Atatürk; however, this replacement had not yet been fully realized.³⁸

Maummar Aksoy's fear of a major resurgence of Islam is recorded in this statement giving reasons why religion should be subjected to state control:

³⁷ As opposed to Ummetçilik (the principle of living within a religious community) which many representatives seemed to feel was still a threat in the countryside. *Ibid.*, pp. 86-91 *passim*.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 103.

If this were avoided, religion could transform itself into a political force in the country; and this had happened several times. For this reason, some had made a defense of the complete separation of State and religion in the so-called Western sense in order to subject the State itself to the control of religion. ...it was necessary for Turkey (to control religion) because religion in Turkey had always tried to infiltrate the administration of the State and the political life of the country.³⁹

Whether or not this degree of near-paranoia was really justified remains to be seen. In any event, de facto state control of religion in Turkey certainly seems to exist. Schools for Muslim clergy are run by the state, religious education in primary schools is from state-authored and approved texts, and the only office specifically mentioned in the 1961 Constitution other than those of President, Prime Minister, Chief of Staff, and the Judiciary, is the Office of Religious Affairs (Art 154)⁴⁰ --it would seem Mssrs. Karal and Aksoy got their wish.

E. SUMMARY

As can be seen from the preceding pages, Turkey, in the last two hundred years, has gone from a state nominally controlled by religion to a nominally secular state in control of religion. The government has gone from monarchy to dictatorship to republic; and control has gone from concentration in the executive to concentration in the legislature.

³⁹ Ibid., pp. 101-102.

⁴⁰ Ibid., p. 140.

It must be understood, however, just as the form of government at the top has not always followed the law of the land, so laws made at the top are not always obeyed by the masses. Indication of this is seen in the direction of the debates in 1961--especially as regards Islam.⁴¹

⁴¹In the wake of the September, 1980 coup, Turkey is presently once again under a military regime and without a constitution. As was the case twenty years earlier, the military regime vows an early return to civilian government. Also, as before, one of the first actions of the new rulers was to begin casting about for persons to write a new constitution--there was rumored to be a draft in existence at the time of the coup. One further point on the 1980 coup--one of the first statements made public after the announcements of curfew times and martial law commanders was to remind the people that "Turkey is a Democratic Secular Nation." Hurriyet, 14 Sep 1980, p. 1. The influence of Islam on the constitution of the third Turkish Republic, however, remains to be seen.

III. ELITES AND POLITICAL PARTIES

As seen above, Turkey has undergone a systematic de-institutionalization of Islam in the national political fabric during the past century. As Turkish government has historically been elitist in nature, these changes were wrought by the elites and more often than not, for the elites. In order to further the investigation of the effect of Islam in Turkey, it is here necessary to pursue its effects on the early elites and their successors in power--political parties and pressure groups.

A. OTTOMAN PERIOD

The functioning of the Ottoman state was governed by the religious, military and bureaucratic elites--nominally, at least, at the behest of the Sultan. The House of Osman was a Gazi empire in the beginning with militarism and Islam as its guiding lights.

Sunni Islam provided legal institutions, education, and the tax system.⁴² The Vakif or religious foundations provided public baths and hotels, and the maintenance of streets and water systems.⁴³

⁴² Shaw and Shaw, History, vol. 1, p. 23.

⁴³ Ibid., p. 27.

The bulk of the military which began as relatively undisciplined tribal armies seeking to garner booty while spreading the faith gave way to a salaried force under Orhan in the fourteenth century. After Orhan's demise in 1360, Murat I began phasing out these forces and replacing them with the kapikullari or "slaves of the Porte".⁴⁴ From this came the Janissary infantry which would be a world standard for infantry for generations and would endure for beyond its usefulness until its abolition in 1826.⁴⁵

The Ottoman bureaucratic tradition also began under Orhan with the appointment of Alauddin Paşa as the first Vezir.⁴⁶ As the Ottoman Empire grew and the problems of administering it became more and more complex, the Sultans ceded increasing power to the Grand and Lesser Vezirs to the point of being only nominally in charge of the day-to-day functioning of the realm.

By the advent of the nineteenth century, then, it was these three forces--the religious, military, and bureaucratic elites--who for better or worse ruled the realm--often without the full participation of the Sultan.

By the end of the eighteenth century, the Ottoman position had so deteriorated as to make reform a matter of

⁴⁴Ibid., pp. 25-26.

⁴⁵Lewis, Emergence, p. 79.

⁴⁶Shaw and Shaw, History, vol. 1, p. 24.

survival. On all fronts the armies of Islam were in disarray; within the empire--especially in Eastern Anatolia--the Sultan's control was, at best, nominal.

Selim III (1789-1807) came to power at a time when profound social and political revolution was rampant in the Christian West. What the modern military might of the Europeans had wrought against the Empire was magnified by the immigration of new thoughts of equality, liberty, and nationalism--especially in the European portions of the realm. To compound a bad situation, the once-feared Janissaries had become soft, corrupt, and unmanageable, as well as outgunned; and the Islamic hierarchy was adamant against change. In this atmosphere, Selim began promoting reform.

The most urgent target was the military. Unfortunately, he was unable to overcome the inertial force of the still politically powerful Janissaries, coupled with the religious leaders of the Empire. In 1807, he was deposed.

A year later, Selim's cousin Mahmud II came to the throne and immediately his Grand Vezir initiated what would have been far-reaching reforms. The conservative reaction was immediate and fierce, and not until eighteen years later was Mahmud able to truly begin modernization.

In 1826, Mahmud eliminated the Janissaries and set forth upon a path of military, administrative, and social reform.

As he gained strength, the control of the Islamic functionaries over many areas began to be overcome, semi-autonomous valley lords and local notables were subjugated, and progress in virtually every aspect of public life was seen. By his death in 1839, there was a modernizing military with political strength deriving from capabilities rather than tradition, and an ever-increasing class of educated persons cognizant with the realities of the nineteenth century worldable to initiate and administer reform. Although the religious hierarchy remained in positions of influence, its authority was eroding with the secularizing influence of western-style education, commercial codes, and military reforms.

"The reforms of Mahmud II and his successors had created a new administrative and governing elite in the Empire, literate, idealistic, and ambitious."⁴⁷ Unfortunately, all Mahmud's successors were not as liberal as he, nor were those who were inclined to reform sufficiently rapid for the new liberals of the day. As shall be shown, Turkish intellectuals, much as their counterparts elsewhere, have never been destined to be satisfied with the pace of reform, no matter how rapid. The upshot was the formation of organized political opposition in the form of the Yeni Osmanlilar (New Ottomans), later to lead to the Young Turks,

⁴⁷ Lewis, Emergence, pp. 150-151.

the Committee of Union and Progress, and the destructive triumvirate of Cemal, Enver, and Talat.

B. THE SINGLE-PARTY ERA

Although numerous organizations were formed to combat absolutism and foreign influence (Vatan, Vatan ve Hürriyet, İttihat ve Terekki Cemiyeti (Committee of Union and Progress) and others), their aim was generally directed at reform and revitalization within the imperial framework. It is unclear when Mustafa Kemal decided not only to reform archaic and abusive methods in government, but to initiate revolutionary change in the form of government and even society; but the formation of the 'Association for the Defense of the Rights of Anatolia and Rumelia' in 1919 served as the basis for Kemal's vehicle of legitimacy, the Republican People's Party. During the Atatürk-Inönü period, the party and the government were as one, and through it, all things happened at the leader's behest.

At the time of Atatürk's accession to power, there were four elite groups in Turkey: the religious elite was reactionary and generally in opposition to Atatürk; the bureaucracy supported Atatürk--especially so after it became obvious he would prevail; the military delighted in one of its number becoming the new head of state; and the intelligentsia, after growing to a considerable size in the previous century, considered Atatürk and his proposed reforms ideal

from their point of view. As indicated in the previous chapter, Atatürk made short work of the religious elite, leaving himself with varying degrees of support among the cream of Turkish political society.

Despite their exclusion from formal power, the religious hierarchy remained always the bogeymen in Turkey. Frey referred to them as 'Public Enemy Number One' during the single-party period.⁴⁸ The extremes resorted to in order to disestablish religion are instructive as to the place of Islam in Turkish society and the depth (or rather lack of it) to which Kemalist reforms managed to penetrate, and will be discussed in the following chapter.

The military and bureaucracy enjoyed the prestige and prerequisites of power--the more so for the military due to their role as a modernizing force of long standing. The military also became the source of most of Turkey's leaders. As in many developing countries, the military provided education and opportunities for social mobility to the many who would otherwise have been left wanting.⁴⁹ Throughout

⁴⁸ Frederick W. Frey, The Turkish Political Elite (Cambridge, Mass.: The M.I.T. Press, 1965), p. 388.

⁴⁹ Nuri Eren, Turkey Today-and Tomorrow: An Experiment in Westernization (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1963), p. 66; and Joseph S. Szyliowicz, "Elites and Modernization in Turkey" in Frank Tachau, ed., Political Elites and Political Development in the Middle East (New York: Schenkman, Redistributed by Holstetd Press, John Wiley and Sons, 1974), p. 33.

the single-party era, large numbers of deputies to the Grand National Assembly have had military backgrounds. Up to the present, every President of Turkey, except Bayar, has had a military background.

Although former officers filled many administrative and elected positions in Atatürk's and İnönü's governments, they were effectively 'civilianized' by requiring resignation from, and to a degree cutting off their contact with the military. Atatürk made the Turkish military into the 'defender and protector' of civilian government, thus laying the groundwork for future intervention which Perlmutter has said is characterized by a "wish to avoid further political involvement" and a hastened return of government to civilians.⁵⁰ Tamkoç on the other hand, is a bit harsher: "The political system of Turkey, in fact if not in law, was based on the principle of the leadership of warriors in civilian clothes who managed the affairs of state in authoritarian fashion."⁵¹ Whatever the verdict on military involvement in government during the single-party era, it suffices to say it was major.

By the mid-1940's, when the single-party era was coming to a close, a new political force had come into being. An entrepreneurial middle class had finally begun to arise from

⁵⁰ Amos Perlmutter, The Military in Politics in Modern Times (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1977), p. 105. Cf *ibid.*, pp. 111 & 163; and Scyliowicz, "Elites", pp. 32-33.

⁵¹ Tamkoç, Warrior Diplomats, p. 249.

the indigenous population to replace the Greek and Armenian merchants who had departed Turkey, by whatever means, during the last few years of the Empire and the early days of the Republic. This new class, being less encumbered by bureaucratic machinery, took away some of the monopoly of the ruling elite over economic policy, especially in the urban centers. Interestingly enough, Eren gives credit for much of their ambition to the military service that brought these persons to the cities in the first place.⁵²

Before closing the discussion on the single-party era, it is necessary to briefly discuss the 'other parties' of the period. The Turkish Worker and Peasant Socialist Party was founded in Istanbul in 1919 and served as a front for the Turkish Communist Party until its prohibition in 1925.⁵³ In 1920, Atatürk took a novel tack against this threat and formed his own "Official Turkish Communist Party" and staffed it with loyal military officers; but it too was done away with. Although at first communism seemed compatible with Islam to many of the uneducated,⁵⁴ this was finally overcome in conservative religious circles after a 1921 'Fetva' from

⁵² Eren, Turkey Today, pp. 66 & 109.

⁵³ George S. Harris, The Origins of Communism in Turkey (Stanford: Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, 1967), p. 41.

⁵⁴ Ibid., pp. 67-68.

the Minister of Religious Affairs condemning it as "incompatible with the Koran".⁵⁵

A second 'other party' was the Free Republican Party founded in 1930 by Ali Fethi Okyar. Due to the massive support the party received--including the conservative east--and the riots attendant to its meetings, after only three months this attempt at democracy was also abandoned.⁵⁶ There were other parties formed during this period, but they were also shortlived and of little importance except to re-emphasize a degree of unrest in the country.

C. THE MULTI-PARTY ERA

On 7 January 1946, the single-party era of Turkish politics came to an end with the registration of the Democrat Party (DP), which was followed in relatively short order by a veritable plethora of others.⁵⁷ Virtually every one of the new parties formed (approximately thirty in seven years) advocated some degree of interest in revitalization of Islam. These included the outwardly Islamic Defense of Islam and Islamic Democratic parties which were more

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 93.

⁵⁶ Lewis, Emergence, pp. 280-281; and Shaw and Shaw, History, vol. 2, p. 382.

⁵⁷ APPENDIX C shows the progress of major political parties.

remarkable for their courage in the face of the still-in-control RPP than for any contributions they might have made.⁵⁸

During this period occurred what has variously been termed 'revival', 'reformation', 'renaissance', or 're-emergence' of Islam in Turkey.⁵⁹ Reemergence seems the better choice as there is ample evidence to show that Islam never went away. In fact, with the beginnings of multi-party politics, would-be elected officials found it suddenly necessary to go to the voters and discover what issues would rouse them to the desired action on election day. The DP did this quite well, and when they went to the peasant majority, the complaints they found were about government neglect of agriculture and Islam. Using this information in the party program--"our party...rejects the erroneous interpretation of secularism in terms of enmity towards religion..."--the DP was able to do well in 1946 and win quite handily in 1950.⁶⁰

Although the relaxation of restrictions on Islam have often been attributed to the Democrat Party, the RPP

⁵⁸ Howard A. Reed, "Secularism and Islam in Turkish Politics", Current History 32 #190 (June 1957): p. 335.

⁵⁹ For three studies of this phenomena in the 1950's Cf: Reed, "Secularism", *passim*; Howard A. Reed, "Revival of Islam in Secular Turkey", Middle East Journal 18 #3 (Summer, 1954), *passim*; and Wilfred Cantwell Smith, Islam in Modern History (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1957), pp. 161-205.

⁶⁰ Reed, "Secularism", pp. 335-336.

actually started this move. During the period 1946-1950, while the RPP was still in power, religious education in the fourth and fifth years of primary school was allowed on a voluntary basis, and foreign exchange for the pilgrimage to Mecca was made available to a number of people. Religious training schools were opened for Imams and Khatibs, and additionally, a Faculty of Theology was opened in the University of Ankara. Also, shortly before the 1950 elections, the tombs of various sultans and saints were reopened.⁶¹

The Democrats, on the other hand, amplified these changes, and added a few as well. Notable were the removal of the prohibition against the call to prayer in Arabic, and the broadcast of Koranic readings on the state-owned radio. Religious education also became mandatory unless the parents did not desire it.⁶²

Numerous reasons for this apparent about-face have been listed:

1. A "wide philosophic trend away from secular positivism" in the Western world.
2. Conviction of the immunity of Ataturk's reforms to Islamic reaction.

⁶¹ Sabine Dirks, Islam et jeunesse en Turquie d'Aujourd'hui (Paris: Librairie Honre Champion, 1977), p. 132 n 1; and Smith, Islam, p. 185.

⁶² Bernard Lewis, "Islamic Revival in Turkey" International Affairs vol. 28 (Jan 1952), p. 41; and Reed, "Revival", pp. 272-274.

3. Need for a "moral and social force to strengthen the community against external attack and internal disruptions" (ie: Communism)
4. Get the "fanatics and lunatics" with their often unorthodox brand of Islam out of the business of agitating the populace
5. Votes⁶³

Certainly the move to multi-party politics ensured that the last of these was not the least.

As the Democrat Party was formed by defectors from the RPP, so too, it had its dissenters; and in 1948, the Nation Party was formed, seeking a more revitalized role for Islam in Turkey. Only five years later (12 July 1953), the party was banned for illegal exploitation of religion and attempting to subvert the reforms of Atatürk--from what data is available, it seems the NP suffered at least as much from not being in power as from ideological viewpoints.⁶⁴

While government began the slow transition from one of elites to one of parties, the military and bureaucracy found themselves severely neglected. The intellectuals had deserted to the DP in search of greater liberalization and more rapid change, leaving their former allies as government employees but not a part of the government. To compound this problem, the world (and Turkey with it) entered a

⁶³ Smith, Islam, pp. 186-187; Lewis, "Islamic", pp. 41, 46-47; and Reed, "Secularism", p. 336.

⁶⁴ Shaw and Shaw, History vol. 2, pp. 409-410.

period of rapid economic growth, but government salaries remained static. The prestige of these two groups fell dramatically.⁶⁵

During this period of rapid growth, the DP's liberal economic policies allowed the rapid expansion of the middle class, and for the first time, this economic sector became an important political force. The attitude of the old established elites--that is to say the military and bureaucracy--toward these businessmen was that of superiors dealing with 'thieves with a vechtie'.⁶⁶ The intellectuals also came to feel that too much emphasis was being placed on gaining and maintaining wealth rather than on needed reforms. When in the mid to late 1950's the DP's maintenance of itself in power began to be perceived as its primary political objective, the intellectuals began to desert back to the ranks of their former partners.⁶⁷

So as the decade of the fifties and the Democrat Party drew to a close, the former in-group was on the outside seeing their power, prestige, and economic status badly eroded. At the same time, there were many real and imagined abuses of Atatürk's reforms--especially in the field of

⁶⁵ Szyliowicz, "Elites", p. 44.

⁶⁶ Ibid., p. 46.

⁶⁷ Ibid., p. 49.

secularism--as the old ruling elites once more banded together for what they supposed to be the good of the nation.

D. THE SECOND TURKISH REPUBLIC

On 27 May 1960 at 0515, Col. Alparslan Türkeş announced over the state radio the overthrow of the government of Menderes and the Democrat Party. The two main issues were political freedom and religion. The result was to throw Turkey completely into the age of power politics.⁶⁸

The three elite groups who provided the impetus for the coup managed to maintain a degree of cohesion long enough to write a new constitution, but this was to be their last coordinated action. The military of the CNU (Committee of National Unity) apparently lacked a cohesive plan beyond the ouster of the Democrat Party, and this divisiveness soon manifested itself.⁶⁹ At the same time, the CNU rather indelicately dismissed 147 university professors, thus alienating their intellectual partners. Overlooked was the fact that the CNU had also forced retirement of more than 5,000 military officers and had strengthened the University Autonomy Law--although the intellectuals espoused reform, they

⁶⁸ Dirks, Islam, p. 135; Karpat, Social Change, p. 232; and Walter F. Welker, The Turkish Revolution 1960-1961: Aspects of Military Politics (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1963), pp. 8-9.

⁶⁹ Welker, Turkish Revolution, p. 145.

appear not to have wanted the same standards applied to themselves as to everyone else.⁷⁰

This and various other factors--both internal and external--served to fragment the intellectual elite and reduce their effectiveness as a single force.⁷¹ The intellectual elite began to fragment over relatively minor nuances in political ideology--providing ideological backing for the many parties that began to spring up. As the intelligentsia had provided the legitimization for the coup,⁷² now it provided a degree of legitimacy for every vein of political thought, thus reducing its own effectiveness in politics.

There were two other disunifying factors in the wake of the 1960 coup: The formation of a large number of parties, thereby splitting the vote and making the formation of a government a difficult task; and the emergence of interest groups onto the political scene.

⁷⁰ Ibid., pp. 53-56.

⁷¹ By the early 1960's, the perception of the Soviet threat had been significantly reduced and as the world moved into the age of detente, this became even more the case. With this reduction of the external threat, internal cohesion began, as so often has been the case in the Middle East, to deteriorate.

⁷² Karpat compares the intelligentsia of 1960 to the clergy of the Ottoman period, and the declaration of a group of professors in Ankara justifying the coup to a fetva from the Seyhulislam. Kemal H. Karpat, "Political Developments in Turkey, 1950-1970" Middle Eastern Studies vol. 12 #1 (Jan. 1976), p. 358.

The four major new parties formed in 1961 are indicative of the divergence of political thought at the time:

Turkish Labor Party (TLP)--Marxist; formed by trade union leaders; finally dissolved in 1971.⁷³

New Turkey Party (NTP)--middle of the road with views nearly the same as the RPP.

Justice Party (JP)--direct successor to the DP; slightly right of center.

Nation Party (NP)--well to the right; successor to the party of the same name which had been banned partly because of its pro-Islamic stance.

The elites had been characterized by their higher educational attainment than the public-at-large, but by the time of the 1960 coup, educational opportunities had opened to many. Certainly, the peasants had not achieved great heights of educational attainment, but the literacy rate no longer hovered at 10-20%. This increased educational level coupled with vastly improved communications media gave a larger portion of the populace a choice of political philosophies from which to choose.

⁷³ This party was led by Behice Boran who had been listed as a known Communist sympathizer by the U.S. State Department as early as 1948. Today there is a new TLP with approximately the same leadership (Boran may or may not still be in jail), but a slightly different name (Türkiye İşçi Partisi vs. the older Türk İş Partisi). This name change is because of a law prohibiting the use of the same name as a previously banned party. (Today there is a Demokratik Partisi whereas Menderes' party was the Demokrat Partisi). The new TLP gained about 0.8% of the 1979 senatorial vote, up from 0.4% in 1977, as compared to the original TLP's average of about 3% in the elections of 1965-1969. OIR proj. no. 4904 Turkish Communists and Communist Sympathizers Dept. of State, 28 Feb. 1948, pp. 13-14; Sabri Sayari, "Aspects of Party Organization in Turkey" Middle East Journal vol. 30 #2 (Spring, 1976), p. 187; and Gunaydin 16 Oct 1979, p. 1.

Labor was never a particularly vocal force in the leadership until the 1960 coup. During the DP regime, economic growth was both rapid and random. The speed of growth attracted many peasants to the cities where squatter villages (gecekondu) began to spring up overnight without benefit of public utilities or other planned social amenities. This was to prove socially very troubling, as will be shown in the next chapter; but as long as new jobs were being created and new migrants were available to take jobs, the workers complained little and voted for the DP whom they saw as the providers of these jobs.

Despite DP promises, there was no provision for collective bargaining or the right to strike until 1963.⁷⁴ Armed with these new capabilities, Türk-İş (Labor Confederation) became a powerful force in Turkish politics.⁷⁵ Their organization and willingness to cooperate with government and management has enabled them to both benefit their members and exercise political influence beyond their numbers.⁷⁶

⁷⁴ Bülent Ecevit, "Labor in Turkey as a New Social and Political Force" in Karpat, Social Change, p. 156.

⁷⁵ According to Karpat Türk-İş supported capitalism. Karpat, Social Change, p. 274 n.3. According to Ecevit, they supported state control. Ecevit, "Labor", p. 163.

⁷⁶ Official numbers show more than two million members, with estimates about half that. William M. Hale, "Labor Unions in Turkey: Progress and Problems" in William M. Hale ed. Aspects of Modern Turkey (London: Bowker, 1976), p. 65; Karpat, Social Change, pp. 269-275; and Ecevit, "Labor", pp. 151-174.

DISK (Confederation of Revolutionary Trade Unions), a socialist group, was formed in 1967 by ex-Türk-İş leaders, and was closely associated with the TLP until it was abolished in 1971. Its membership is minimal and concentrated chiefly in Istanbul.⁷⁷

Prior to the 1960 coup, students too were not a major political force, but became more vocal and impatient afterward. At the same time, the students, following the lead of other intellectuals, also began to divide over ideology as is still manifested today in continuous strife on the nation's university campuses. Ironically, the strengthened University Autonomy Law mentioned above has actually aided this unrest.⁷⁸

As in most of the rest of the world, students in Turkey rioted freely in the late 1960's; but where most incidents in the West were against the existing order--especially the administration of the universities, in Turkey there was the added dimension of extreme left vs. extreme right. The left was represented by Dev Genc which was closely affiliated with the TLP, while the extreme right, with a strong Muslim hue ("...if it had not been for the Islamic religion the

⁷⁷ Ecevit, "Labor", pp. 174-176.

⁷⁸ Joseph S. Szlylowicz, A Political Analysis of Student Activism: The Turkish Case (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1972), pp. 60-61.

whole country would have turned red"),⁷⁹ was only minimally organized at that time. The left, with some Palestinian ties, resorted to terrorism and the military eventually forced the resignation of Demirel over this issue in 1971.⁸⁰

It is interesting here to note the attitude of Turkish students toward religion as found by surveys conducted in 1966--or about the time of the beginning of serious student unrest. Of lycee students surveyed who were preparing to enter the Political Science Faculty, all felt religion was necessary, but 12% of the freshmen and a quarter of the graduating class felt religion was no longer necessary to them. In another survey, 20% of freshmen, 35% of sophomores, 42% of juniors, and 49% of seniors rated religion of little or no importance. This, of course, shows an obvious secularizing influence of higher education. At the same time, as many as 40% felt religion was very important. Interest in politics and tendencies toward the left were more prevalent in those who saw little importance in religion.⁸¹

Later, after the fall of the Demirel regime, a survey conducted during the period 1970-1973 showed somewhat different results. In response to a question about what most

⁷⁹ Ibid., pp. 54-55.

⁸⁰ Ibid., p. 65.

⁸¹ G. R. Field, "Religious Commitment and Work Orientations of Turkish Students" in Human Organization vol. 27 #2 (Summer 1968), pp. 147-151 *passim*; and Leslie L. Roos, Jr., Noralou P. Roos, and Gary R. Field, "Students and Politics in Turkey" in Daedalus vol. 97 #1 (Winter 1968), pp. 134-203 *passim*.

interested them other than their studies and their jobs, 103 of 250 respondents (students from eleven different faculties/universities) answered "religion" second only to "friendship" (114). Politics came in fifth with only fourteen responses, suggesting probably the majority of Turkish students were interested mostly in an education.⁸²

This interest in religion is further correlated by the dramatic rise in popularity during the same period of the National Salvation Party (NSP). The NSP was founded 11 Oct 1972 by Necmetin Erbakan who had been the founder/president of the National Order Party (NOP). The NOP had been founded on 26 Jan 1970 "...for the reintroduction in Turkey of the religious values of the past" and was dissolved in 1972 for being "hostile to the Constitution of the Turkish Republic..." --specifically Article 19 (Appendix B). The NSP evidently struck some chords of favor with its campaign against mini-skirts and foreign tourism, as it won forty-eight seats in Grand National Assembly with 12% of the vote in 1973.⁸³

Despite reactionary comments by Erbakan during the campaign, Ecevit had little choice but to bring him into a coalition government.⁸⁴ Erbakan's parliamentary immunity

⁸² Dirks, Islam, pp. 302-303 & 351-352.

⁸³ Ibid., p. 140-141.

⁸⁴ "We are going to suppress the system of interest in banks" and "We are going to close the gaming and drinking houses...and the sports stadiums" etc. quoted in Dirks, Islam, p. 142.

saved him from thirty-eight suits brought against him for anti-secular propaganda and insults against the republican form of the state.⁸⁵ As late as March 1978, Mr. Erbakan was still the center of legal controversy as his fellow-representatives were trying to get him prosecuted for exploiting religion for politics.⁸⁶

In any event, many Western observers now believe Erbakan, although not necessarily his party, to be politically bankrupt.⁸⁷ This is probably due more to his unrealistic and disjointed economic views and inability to get along with nearly everyone in government than his religious views. Whatever the reason, the NSP fell to 9% in the 1977 elections and rose slightly to about 10% in 1979.⁸⁸

There was at least one area where Erbakan was found useful to the state--courting the friendship (and hopefully the oil and money) of fellow Muslims. Of course, since the oil embargo and ensuing price hikes of 1973-1974, the government

⁸⁵ Milliyet, 10 Jan 74.

⁸⁶ Pulse #3682, 17 Mar 78

⁸⁷ Manchester Guardian Weekly, 25 Feb 79.

⁸⁸ Hürriyet, 16 Oct 79, p. 5.

has spent considerable time and effort in this pursuit.⁸⁹ In conjunction with this new impetus of Islam in government, Lüfti Doğan, in preparation for the commemoration of the 1500th year of the Islamic calendar, celebrated the "spirit of Islam" and reminded the world that "Atatürk... set... an example for the Islamic world's independence."⁹⁰

Although both Erbakan and Doğan are members of the NSP, this party certainly has not provided all of the pro-Islamic statements in the past few years--even Ecevit has been reported to use the name of Allah in public political debate.⁹¹ This notwithstanding, the primary exploiter of religious sentiment for political gain outside the NSP today seems to be Alparslan Türkeş.

Türkeş first appeared on the political scene in 1944 when he and a group of other students and some professors charged the government with protecting Communists. He is listed by at least one source as being "nationalist and racist" at that time and seems not to have changed much

⁸⁹ From Feb. 1974 when Republican Turkey, for the first time participated in an Islamic conference (Lahore), to improved relations with Libya, to construction of mosques in Saudi Arabia, to publication of Korans for other Moslem countries, Turkey has been actively pursuing improved relations with other Muslim countries with whom relations had been minimal since 1923. Dirks, Islam, p. 144; Pulse #3655, 8 Feb 78, #3688, 27 Feb 78, #3669, 28 Feb 78, #3773, 28 Jul 78, etc.

⁹⁰ Pulse #3694, 6 Apr 78.

⁹¹ Dirks, Islam, pp. 143-144.

since.⁹² In 1960, he was part of the military take-over, but was dismissed when he became openly hostile to returning the government to civilian rule. After returning from a period in India, he began to organize rightist youth to counter Dev-Genç and the TLP,⁹³ providing them with military training and converting some into veritable fanatics.⁹⁴

More recently, Mr. Türkəş, who does not like being called names ("If anybody calls me a fascist or a murderer, I'll tear his mouth apart"), has been the head of the pan-Turkish National Action Party (NAP).⁹⁵ He has been accused of inciting Sunni Muslims against the generally leftist Alevis (a Shia sect) in the southeastern portion of Turkey; and with slogans like "Turkey for Muslim Turks", at least helping to set off the Karamanmaraş riots of December, 1978.⁹⁶

E. SUMMARY

In this chapter we have looked briefly at the people and organizations who are in a position to effectively influence policy in Turkey--the elites, the political parties, and a few interest groups. Professor Szyliowycz has said

⁹² Ibid., p. 264.

⁹³ Ibid., p. 294.

⁹⁴ Ibid., p. 250.

⁹⁵ Christian Science Monitor, 8 Jan 79.

⁹⁶ Ibid.; Manchester Guardian Weekly, 25 Dec 77.

there are no elites in Turkey today,⁹⁷ but the military has been considered an elite in Turkey for centuries and still retains sufficient influence to be considered so. The primary reason for Professor Szyliowycz's statement appears to be the extreme fragmentation of parties and the intellectual elite after the coup of 1960-61. Also, since 1961 the previously poorly organized peasants and workers have become more of a political force, consequently reducing the hold of elite elements on the reigns of power in Turkey. Likewise, the intelligentsia retains certain vestiges of its elite status, but it is so fragmented, providing small elite groups for every vein of political thought, as to no longer be an effective force. Also, much of the intellectual activity is confined to students who are more military than academic.

The leading parties--the Republican People's and Justice Parties--primarily concern themselves with legitimate concerns of government, with relatively low-key pandering to the peasants. On the other hand, the next most powerful parties--the NSP and NAP--spend a great deal of their respective political efforts directly appealing to the religious feelings of their constituencies. As pointed out above, the NSP has a fairly broad appeal while Türkes' group tends to

⁹⁷ Interview, 8 Aug 78.

promote sectarian strife between the majority Sunnis and the minority Alevis, advocating, or at least condoning violence in large measure.

Although the two rightist parties do not command a large following (together they polled just over 16% of the valid vote in the October 1979 elections), both the JP and RPP have found it necessary to form coalitions with them in the past as the JP has been forced to do again in order not to force early elections. Politics have been so fragmented in Turkey since the formation of the Second Republic in 1960 as to make the likelihood of a clear majority government without one or both of these parties seem remote. If this is indeed the case, religion will remain an issue in Turkish politics for some time to come.

Now that the leadership and major interest groups have been dealt with, there remains only one segment of society to discuss--the estimated 73% who have only comparatively recently become aware of their political importance; the group that is still emerging from tribalism into the twentieth century--the Turkish peasantry. This is the subject of the final chapter.

IV. ISLAM AND THE PEOPLE

Islam, as far as the West was concerned, began to revive as an issue of interest in the late 1940's and early 1950's. As noted above, this period saw a considerable number of articles on Turkey's Islamic 'revival.'⁹⁸ In fact, Islam never died to require resuscitation. What actually seems to have happened was Turkey discovered multi-party politics and politicians discovered religion.

Many social thinkers have agreed that people tend to gravitate toward religion in times of stress and perhaps away when times are good.⁹⁹ In light of this, it would be natural to find evidence of Turks turning toward a deeper involvement with Islam during the war years and beginning to drift away after the influx of Marshal Plan aid began in the early 1950's.

Reed has found an increased emphasis on Islam in Turkey during the Second World War when many goods were in short supply, most men were in the army, and for several years

⁹⁸ See above p. 35.

⁹⁹ Karl Marx, "Contributions to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right: Introduction," in The Marx-Engels Reader, 2nd ed., ed. Robert C. Tucker (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1978), p. 54 and Pitirim A. Sorokin, quoted in Ted Robert Gurr, Why Men Rebel (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1970), p. 312.

there was a very real threat of war. The army even returned Imams to units.¹⁰⁰ This, of course, coincides nicely with the theory, but the majority of the "Islamic Revivalists" have centered on the period of Democratic Party rule.

If in fact, a sudden revitalization of Islam had occurred to the extent some would have us believe, evidence should have been readily forthcoming in the form of ballot box success for the single-issue pro-Islamic parties. This was not the case. The Democrats, victors in 1950, did undeniably appeal to the religious voter, but their party platform was sufficiently broad to attract enough votes to win. Every party did, in fact, attempt to some degree to attract votes from the devout. This then, was the source of the 'Islamic Revival' of the 1950's--the politicians' quest for votes in a free and democratic system.¹⁰¹

This was the source, but the reason was the feeling--obvious to the politicians--of the Turk for his religion. Religion has throughout history played an important role in electoral politics--if only as a strong undercurrent--around the world.¹⁰² In a country where the government had

¹⁰⁰ Reed, "Revival," p. 231.

¹⁰¹ See above pp. 34-38.

¹⁰² Philip E. Converse, "Some Priority Variables in Comparative Electoral Research," in Comparative Politics: Notes and Readings, 5th ed., ed. Roy C. Macridis and Bernard E. Brown (Homewood, Ill: The Dorsey Press, 1977), pp. 344-345.

been associated with religion to a degree such as was the case in Turkey, its strength would seem sure to be residual for generations. The key, of course, was the relaxation by the RPP--controlled National Assembly of controls on religious topics. As Bernard Lewis said in 1952:

The peasantry are still as religious as they have always been. For them there is no question of revival--the only difference is that they can now express their religious sentiments more openly.¹⁰³

By the time of Lewis' writing, the combination of Marshall Plan economic aid, Truman Doctrine military aid, and the general worldwide post-war boom was beginning to have an effect in Turkey. As a result of this rapid growth of prosperity, cities began to rapidly expand with villagers seeking to improve their lot in life.

This migration to the cities inevitably brought rather primitive peasants into contact with a certain degree of modernity. As well, rather than being tied to the land where forces were often well beyond his control, the peasant found himself in a place where a degree of technology was being used to promote the control of his physical and social environment. The coming of improved communications and association with a market economy reduced the peasant's ability to explain virtually everything away as the will of Allah. According to Kautsky, peasants find this "profoundly

¹⁰³ Lewis, "Islamic Revival," p. 46.

upsetting."¹⁰⁴ This, of course, was the beginning of modernization--said to be nearly synonomous by some with secularization--for many Turks.¹⁰⁵

This combination of a degree of emphasis on religion by politicians and a gradual modernizing by some Turks continued throughout the DP regime. Then in 1960, the military overthrew Menderes and company and proceeded with what Karpat refers to as the 'defense of secularism' as the first issue:

The press reported fully the activities of religious conservatives, but without arousing much reaction beyond the small circle of dedicated secularists. The countryside seemed to pay little attention to the intellectual's secularist outcry, chiefly because economic issues there had acquired vital priority. Politicians found quickly that villagers and small town dwellers were not interested in scientific explanations of the origin of mankind or the universe, but in current matters. As long as the virtues of Islam were not challenged directly, the citizen would not be drawn into religious controversy or rely on religion to solve all his problems. The fact remained that the basic reforms were deeply rooted in the social body and no group challenged the secular character of the regime.¹⁰⁶

By the mid-1960's Turkey had: gone through secularizing reforms led by the national hero and founding father; gone through a ten-year period of secularization-by-modernization;

¹⁰⁴ John H. Kautsky, The Political Consequences of Modernization (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1972), p. 95.

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 19-20.

¹⁰⁶ Karpat, "Social Groups," in Social Change, p. 265. His footnote is also instructive where he claims "...various intellectuals who claimed that religion was the most powerful issue in Turkey..." seldom visited the countryside and when they did, attempted only to verify their preconceived view rather than to perform objective research.

and had been again subjected to a legislated secularization by the military. Then in 1972, after a period of continued economic growth (if not the degree of prosperity of the 1950's) and some political instability, the National Salvation Party was founded and the following year garnered nearly twelve percent of the nation-wide vote.¹⁰⁷ The 1980 military takeover again began with a statement of the secular nature of the Turkish state.¹⁰⁸ What has caused this constant need on the part of governments to periodically reintroduce secularization and the seeming inability of the Turks themselves to realize it?

Tamkoç was quick to point out: "No attempt was made to reform the fundamental precepts of the religion or to reform the belief system that rested essentially on the faith itself.¹⁰⁹ The Islamic belief system then is all that remains. The belief system as it applies to the individual Turk--not in his groups but within himself--is what needs to be addressed.

¹⁰⁷ Harris estimated the 'prayer-rug vote' at about ten percent in 1979--not great but it had been enough to continue the NSP in and out of coalitions for seven years. George S. Harris, "Islam and the State in Modern Turkey," Middle East Review vol. XI no. 4 (Summer 1979), p. 26.

¹⁰⁸ Hurriyet, 14 Sep 1980, p. 1. While making a point of their secularization, the new military government also required female government employees to be modestly dressed.

¹⁰⁹ Tamkoç, Warrior Diplomats, p. 100.

Unfortunately, there seems to be no concept of a Muslim 'mind set' with which to compare that of the Turks--this too being an undefined and possibly undefinable abstraction. Certainly there are parallels one can draw between character traits of the Turkish male and other Muslim males--quick temper, fierce pride, the premium placed on strength, relationship with women and their honor, "us against them" attitudes--but these might be a result of the Islamic heritage or previous nomadic existence or several other factors.¹¹⁰ The comparisons are certainly not clear and the study would require an effort of great magnitude and many years duration. For these reasons, the remainder of this paper will be limited to a brief look at the way the Turk practices his faith.¹¹¹

There are two predominant varieties of Islam in Turkey: Sunni Islam, the orthodox faith at least nominally adhered to by the majority of Turks; and folk Islam, generally

¹¹⁰ Frey offers some character traits for elites that seem to apply to most Muslim (although not always Christian) Turks. Frederick W. Frey, "Patterns of Elite Politics in Turkey," in Political Elites in the Middle East, ed. George Lenczowski (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1975), pp. 64-72. These can be compared with considerable caution to Raphael Patai, The Arab Mind (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1976), *passim*. I say with caution because of the criticism Patai had taken from some experts in the field such as Michael C. Hudson in his Arab Politics (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977), p. 52.

¹¹¹ Except as otherwise noted, material in this section is the result of observations, interviews and casual conversation during six months of travel throughout Turkey during the period February-July, 1980.

claimed to be Sunni by the practitioners but often with a considerable number of deviations.¹¹²

A. SUNNI ISLAM

Islam is 'the very foundation of society,' permeating the entire fabric of life; political, social, and private. Religion, state, day-to-day personal conduct and interaction are intermingled throughout the Quran and Hadith. Although this ideal integration has never been totally achieved (except perhaps briefly in the time of the Prophet and the four Orthodox Caliphs), it has nevertheless served in Islamic lands as a basis from which all else is derived.

The basis for all Islam of course, is the Quran with the traditions and sayings of the Prophet utilized for clarification and specific examples. Within this body of literature, the faithful are beseeched to do or not do many things. The major of these have come to be referred to as the "Five Pillars." It is instructive to observe the compliance of Turks with these most basic tenants of their faith.

¹¹²The Alevi (Shia) branch of Islam represents a small minority of undeterminable size estimated to be between five and twenty percent of the population. During several trips to what are reputed to be primarily Alevi areas, no one was willing to say he was in fact not Sunni. For these reasons, Alevis are not included as a specific portion of this study.

1. The Five Pillars

a. The Profession of Faith

"There is no god but God and Muhammad is the Messenger of God."¹¹³ Practically every child born into a Muslim household hears this from his first hours, it is called to him from the minarets five times daily, its recitation makes him a Muslim. This is the test of being a Muslim and virtually all Turkish Muslims pass it. Its recitation does not make the reciter a good Muslim, just a Muslim.¹¹⁴

b. Daily Prayer

Islam enjoins the faithful to pray five times a day.¹¹⁵ The mezzin's call goes unheeded by an enormous number among the city dwellers. In the countryside however, it is not uncommon to see a person or group stop to pray at

¹¹³ Quran CXII: *passim*. See also Ceasar E. Farah, *Islam* (Woodbury, NY: Barron's Educational Series, Inc., 1970), pp. 103-104.

¹¹⁴ It should be added here that virtually no distinction exists between the words Turk and Muslim as applied to persons within the country. A person whose ancestors might well have lived in what is now Turkey before the first Turk arrived might not be considered a 'real Turk' because he is not Muslim. In 1965, Frey in *Elites*, p. 144, talked about the moral stigma attached to being a non-Muslim and there is no visible difference today. In discussions with Christian Turks who have lived in the country all their lives, as had their parents, a statement like "Because I am a Christian I am not really a Turk," is not uncommon. I have heard one Christian referred to as a Turk, but the speaker said he was definitely an exception. These observations are from Istanbul, July, 1980. In Malatya and Erzincan it was, "We Turks are all Muslims." Malatya, 27 March 1980; Erzincan, 10 June 1980.

¹¹⁵ Quran XI: 114.

the appropriate times. At the same time, there may be a group of by-standers--most often young men--going about their business or simply standing around looking embarrassed.¹¹⁶

The Muslim faithful are strongly encouraged to gather at a mosque for the noon prayer on Fridays.¹¹⁷ At other times, circumstances permitting, mosque attendance is considered a good and beneficial act, but is not required. Prayers at these times are generally attended by elderly and retired men who have little else to occupy their time.

Friday noon prayer attendance tends to vary according to location and degree of modernity. In Bodrum, formerly a fishing and agriculture town currently enjoying a profitable tourist trade, total attendance has hardly changed in the past ten years despite considerable population

¹¹⁶ It is possible to see elderly Turks in prayer on trains, in shops, and at the side of roads throughout Turkey. Most hotels have a mihrab indicating the direction of Mecca for their customers. The key word here is elderly, however, as one seldom sees a young man in his early twenties performing the namaz. I have actually seen and heard a few younger men ridicule their elders for praying in a public place, although generally the standersby will respect the religious feelings of those so engaged.

¹¹⁷ Quran LXII: 9-10.

growth and construction of at least four new mosques.¹¹⁸ Şahmuratlı, on the other hand, is a small central Anatolian farming community with a single recently-built mosque and near universal attendance on Fridays and during holidays.¹¹⁹

One cause of this lower attendance at Friday mosque of course, is Atatürk's realignment of the Turkish week with that of the western world for business purposes, thus requiring public offices to remain open on Friday. In the larger cities with a great deal of international commerce, people have found it more convenient to be open on Fridays. This results in very few city businesses being closed, thus reducing the number of people available for attendance at the noon sermon.

Ankara, despite being the capital, is more rural than either Istanbul or Izmir. As a result, many workers

¹¹⁸ Bodrum went from 5,000 to 8,000 population from 1965 to 1979. On 8 Feb 1980, the attendance at the 'new' mosque of Mansur's study was under forty as compared with the approximate 100 who normally attended in the entire town in 1969. The Friday market showed no signs of reduction in trade despite the presence of the mosque on the same square. The hundreds of people milling about were virtually all Turks as the tourist season had not yet begun. Fatma Mansur, Bodrum; a Town in the Aegean (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1972), pp. 98-114.

¹¹⁹ In Şahmuratlı, the villagers are extremely proud of their new mosque, constructed entirely with their own money and labor. The secularly-educated school teacher said it was filled on Fridays and for religious holidays, with late-comers being left to pray in the courtyard. Interview, Şahmuratlı, Yozgat Province, 27 May 1980. This was also found to be true by Szyliowicz in Erdemli when it was still a very rural area. Szyliowicz, Erdemli, p. 102.

have a more recent peasant background than their counterparts in the other cities. Atatürk moved the capital of his secular republic to Ankara to escape the imperial and religious trappings of Istanbul. Now in apparent contradiction, Istanbul is probably the most secular city in Turkey while in Ankara Islam is much more strictly observed. The main maintenance facility supporting the US military presence in the city of Ankara provides a bus every Friday for the noon sermon, and every Friday it is filled with better than fifty percent of the workers.¹²⁰

c. The Giving of Alms

The faithful are told to help the poor.¹²¹ Occasionally one will see an obviously poor man searching for change for a five lira coin (\$1=80 lira) to give a lira to a beggar who is worse off. More often, one will see obviously wealthier people avoid a beggar or order him away. There is generally more hospitality among the peasants than among the wealthy who often expect a return on any investments they make, no matter how small.

d. Keeping the Fast of Ramazan

The month of Ramazan on the Islamic calendar is dedicated to a month-long fast during the daylight hours.¹²²

¹²⁰The fact that the workers do not get any extra time off for this exercise (eg: they must return to work for the afternoon) should be noted. Interview, Ankara, 26 Jan 1980.

¹²¹Quran IX: 60.

¹²²Quran II: 187.

It is possible to see entire families, parts of families, or none of the members of a family observing this fast. As the number of street vendors and open restaurants does not diminish noticeably during Ramazan (at least in Istanbul), it would seem to suggest very little decline in the number of patrons. In the countryside, however, the propensity to follow the fast seems to be greater. Participation for the peasants has been estimated at greater than 95%.¹²³ Ankara has been estimated to have thirty to fifty percent of the population who fast, while Istanbul is considered to be much less (possibly less than ten percent).¹²⁴ In Şahmuratlı, both the hoca and the schoolteacher said the fast was generally adhered to throughout the area.¹²⁵

e. The Pilgrimage

The Pilgrimage (Hac) to Mecca is a requirement for those who can afford it.¹²⁶ Making the Hac is quite a prestigious event in rural Turkey. Those who have completed it are generally revered by their peers and become a source

¹²³ Interview with Doğan Uçucu, Defense Ministry official from Ankara, Izmir, 15 Feb 1980.

¹²⁴ Ibid.

¹²⁵ Interview, Şahmuratlı, Yozgat Province, 27 May 1980.

¹²⁶ Quran III: 96.

of pride to their relatives.¹²⁷ Despite this good feeling toward the Haci, many people show no desire to go themselves. They plead economic woes in the presence of their Haci relatives, but often privately say they feel no real need for it.

2. Right Actions

Other than the "Five Pillars," there are also a great number of "right actions" and "forbidden acts" given to believers as more or less mandatory guidelines of conduct. A few of these follow.

The good Muslim is enjoined to honor and respect his parents.¹²⁸ Past researchers have found this to be a common trait of junior family members.¹²⁹ Today the pattern is much the same. Seldom will a younger member of a family

¹²⁷ Because of the state of the Turkish economy, most persons cannot financially afford to go. Foreign currency restrictions on the part of the government were such until a few years ago as to make the Hac practically impossible. Between 1974 and 1977 these restrictions were eased so as to allow the faithful who so desired to make one pilgrimage in their lifetimes. Harris, "Islam," p. 25.

¹²⁸ Quran XVII: 23-24.

¹²⁹ Paul J. Magnanella, "Aspects of Kinship Change in a Modernizing Turkish Town," Human Organization, vol. 31, no. 4 (winter 1972), p. 364; Sterling, Village, p. 101. On this subject Sterling mentions many rules of conduct between father and son. Although Sterling was writing of 1950, many of the rules still apply to varying degrees (ie: not smoking in the father's presence and almost universal deference to the father's opinion is still common. Interview with Esat Naiboğlu, Istanbul, March, 1980). Fathers still select the son's bride in some places, as well. Interview, Malatya, 5 March 1980.

openly dispute his parents in their presence. A son will rarely smoke or drink in his father's presence until after he has left home to start a separate life of his own. Instances have been documented where young family members (male) have left home to avoid disrespect to parents--there being no mechanism for rational conflict resolution within the family.¹³⁰

The Quran forbids the eating of pork, the drinking of intoxicants (generally interpreted to include smoking cigarettes, etc.), and gambling.¹³¹ Virtually no one eats pork.¹³² Drinking, smoking and gambling, on the other hand, are a different story.

Wine, beer, and raki (a relative of anisette) are readily available in all cities and towns and in larger villages. The incidence of severe abuse is not great, but a large percentage of the male (and much of the more westernized female) population does in fact imbibe. Smoking is a pastime for an extremely large segment of the population.

¹³⁰ Kemal H. Karpat, The Gecekondu: Rural Migration and Urbanization (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976), p. 27.

¹³¹ Quran II: 173 (pork); V: 90 (intoxicants and gambling).

¹³² It should be noted that the summer heat and dryness in much of Turkey (as in most of the Muslim world) effectively prohibits the raising of swine. Also, the lack of refrigeration in much of the country along with frequent power outages makes the likelihood of diseases associated with pork a very real threat. For these reasons, it can be reasonably assumed that even without its prohibition, little pork could be consumed in Turkey.

In the tea houses (cayhane) a veritable fog of acrid smoke hangs every evening. During time of shortage, it is not uncommon to see long lines of men, women and children waiting in a freezing rain to buy cigarettes.¹³³

Gambling, in an organized sense, does not appear to be widespread. There are casinos in the major tourist cities, but these are generally only for tourists as very few Turks could ever afford them.

Small-scale private gambling does exist, however, and virtually every cayhane has several game sets of various types which may be used for this purpose. This does not seem to be a major social disease, but rather a form of recreation. Still, it is strictly forbidden in the Quran.

Another area of specific prohibition in the Quran is usury--expanded by most Muslims to include all interest.¹³⁴ Although Mansur found a few incidents of people foregoing interest as a religious principle, it was a definite minority in Bodrum--and during a period of general prosperity, as well.¹³⁵ No reliable figures are available today on a

¹³³ During January and February, 1980, there were severe cigarette shortages due to strikes. At that time, a cayhane or office could be emptied in a matter of seconds by the rumor of a shop having cigarettes for sale. It was not unusual to see school-age children, sent by their parents, standing in line in snow, ice, and rain, waiting to buy a single pack.

¹³⁴ Quran II: 275; III: 129.

¹³⁵ Mansur, Bodrum, p. 69.

nationwide or even local basis, but considering the unemployment rate of 25 percent, and inflation approaching three figures, it is difficult to imagine anyone with enough money to need a savings account being willing to give up the 44.5% interest currently being offered.¹³⁶

Banks in Turkey have certainly not taken up the practice now prevalent in some Arab countries (notably Saudi Arabia) of not charging interest, but rather sharing in profits--unfortunately there are too few profit-making ventures in Turkey today for this.¹³⁷

One evening in Rize on the eastern Black Sea coast, during a discussion with two mid-level executives, the topic of non-compliance with the edicts of Islam brought the following response: "As long as we believe there is but one God and that Muhammad is His Prophet and we don't do anything to hurt others, we will go to heaven." They said they could freely disobey the do's and don'ts as long as they hurt no one but themselves. It should also be noted that they considered themselves and the other residents of the area to be much more religious than in the large cities.¹³⁸

¹³⁶ Hurriyet, 4 Sept 1980, pp. 7 & 15.

¹³⁷ Ibid.

¹³⁸ Interview, ÇAY-KUR Araştırma Enstitüsü, Rize, 2 June 1980.

Above we have seen how some of the basic requirements of Islam are adhered to while others are not. This, of course, resembles the behavior found in most societies--namely, men being aligned with a certain value system as long as it is convenient and serves their immediate purposes.

As for the "Five Pillars," except for the expensive Hac, most Turks participate in the rites at some time in their lives, but few in the cities could be called devout practitioners of their faith.

B. FOLK ISLAM

Islam, with no official clergy, places a strong premium on the believer's ability to read Arabic. Prior to the conversion to Latin script, Turkish shared for the main part a common alphabet with Arabic, and so allowed the literate to at least pronounce the words of the Quran. Since the change of alphabet, even this ability has been largely lost, leaving the Turkish people almost universally illiterate as regards their religion.

In such a situation as this, where the chief source of a religion is in a foreign language, that religion can only be a strong influence in a 'folk' sense, having as many different variations as there are teachers.

More recently, the disestablishment of Islam as the state religion during the early Republican period led to even greater heterodoxy. When Atatürk put an end to the

Caliphate and all the other religious trappings of the Ottoman Empire and then later reformed the language, he successfully cut the people off--not from their religion, but rather from a factual knowledge of it.

Essentially, prior to the reinstitution of religious education in 1946, an entire generation was cut off from any open association with people who had had formal religious training. After the reinstitution of religious education in 1946, and later under the DP, people who were appointed by the Ministry of Religious Affairs to local religious posts, especially in smaller villages, were often poorly qualified. Several instances have been recorded of religious teachers having sufficient knowledge of Arabic script to be able to read the Quran, but without understanding the words' meanings.¹³⁹

Lacking both knowledgeable teachers and the ability to read the Quran for themselves, strict observance of the more subtle points of Islam could reasonably be expected to

¹³⁹ A friend was on a trip in the eastern part of Turkey when he happened to see a hoca teaching a small Quran class in the courtyard of a mosque. He asked the boys what they were learning, and they replied they were memorizing parts of the Quran and recited for him. He asked what the passage they had recited meant and none could tell him. He then asked the hoca the same question and he, too, could not answer except to say it was written in the Quran and therefore was holy. Discussion with V. Varhos, Monterey, CA., Sep, 1979 (event occurred in early 1970's). Cf. Sterling, Village, p. 275. The religious textbooks currently in use in Turkish schools, while being basically accurate, add a certain nationalistic flavor (ie: protecting the nation's natural resources, etc.) See Dirks, Islam, pp. 144-167 for some of the subjects.

lapse. This lapse probably would have been quite minor however, if strict adherence had been the rule under the Ottomans. But throughout Turkey over the years, various aberrations had been commonplace.

Turkey has, of course, abounded with a variety of religious teachers over the centuries. The Dervish orders were a modification of orthodox Islam designed for popular consumption. The largely illiterate Turkish population of Ottoman and earlier times flocked to the Dervish Tarikats which naturally grew strong with increased numbers. The common people turned to the Tarikats for leadership and discipline in their religious lives.

The Dervish orders were not immediately attacked by Atatürk, but after the Kurdish/Dervish revolt of 1925, he acted quickly and on 2 Sep 1925, the Tarikats were disbanded.¹⁴⁰ In Turkey today the Mevleve sect is still represented in the form of the Mevlana Mosque in Konya (now a museum) and the Whirling Dervishes who perform worldwide. Other Dervish sects, while still banned, are known to have operated as recently as 1975; and in 1972, five deputies in Parliament were purported to be Süleymancilar.¹⁴¹

¹⁴⁰ Lewis, Emergence, pp. 404-442.

¹⁴¹ Dirks, Islam, pp. 168-177. Mansur was also able to point to a considerable contribution of Bektashi ceremony to the religious life of Bodrum in 1969, although they were sometimes ascribed solely to orthodox Islam. Mansur, Bodrum, pp. 101, 108, 110.

In Turkey, as in much of the Middle East, women have long been treated in accordance with local tradition; but almost invariably, the treatment is attributed to Islam. In Erzurum, the great majority of women seen on the city streets are among the most covered in the Moslem world. They are covered from head to toe with a one-piece cloth garment. Whereas in most places where the veil is in use, the eyes are left uncovered, In Erzurum such is not the case. Many of the women are guided by young children as if they were blind--those without such guides are able to cross the streets only with great luck.

Asked why the women were so covered, one man replied, "It is a penalty for their sins." Another stated it was a requirement of Islam.¹⁴² According to Abū Dawūd Sulaimān, Muhammad indicated that the face and hands could remain uncovered after a woman reached puberty, and nowhere in the Quran is there a requirement for a woman to be completely covered.¹⁴³

The matter of inheritance is reasonably clearly spelled out in the Quran and Hadith.¹⁴⁴ Women have an appointed

¹⁴² This dress and these comments as to its justification were common in the Erzurum-Erzincan-Gumushane area. 8-14 June, 1980.

¹⁴³ Abū Dawūd Sulaimān, Hadith 31: 30, cited in Maulana Muhammad Ali, The Holy Quran, 6th ed. (Chicago: Specialty Promotions, 1973), notes 1751 and 1751a.

¹⁴⁴ Quran IV: 7-12 and 177.

share equal to half a man's. In Turkish village life, women have been effectively disinherited in many cases.

In the early 1950's, women in some central Anatolian villages generally inherited nothing. Sterling, who gives several samples, states about a daughter's inheritance, "I never heard of this provision having been applied nor ever seriously suggested."¹⁴⁵

Another point is that of divorce. The Quran provides women the right to request divorce, but when Republican Turkey granted this right to women, it was considered a great innovation.¹⁴⁶

A last point where Folk Islam is in evidence in Turkey is superstition. Charms to ward off the 'evil eye' (nazar) are everywhere in evidence.¹⁴⁷ Houses and small businesses throughout the country have blue windows and doors to guard against nazar. This includes not only the remote villages

¹⁴⁵ Sterling, Village, p. 122.

¹⁴⁶ Quran II: 229. Cf. Ruth Frances Woodsmall, Women and the New East (Washington: Middle East Institute, 1960), p. 3, and Nermin Abadan-Unat, "The Modernization of Turkish Women," Middle East Journal vol. 32 no. 3 (Summer 1978), pp. 291-296.

¹⁴⁷ Upon renting an apartment in Istanbul, our neighbors (dentists, merchants, and military) presented us with no fewer than six charms to keep away the nazar.

of central and eastern Anatolia, but modern apartment buildings in the west as well.¹⁴⁸

Folk Islam is deeply rooted in Turkey's history, primarily in the form of the Dervish orders. The primary difference in these deviations from orthodox Islam as compared to those mentioned earlier lies in the fact of belief by the people that these practices are actually a part of their Sunni faith, whereas the smokers and drinkers have made a conscious choice to ignore Islamic edicts.

C. SUMMARY

This section has dealt briefly with the influence of Islam on the individual. Although Ataturk's secularizing reforms have been in effect for a half century, not only has Islam not been effectively eliminated from Turkish political life, it has scarcely been touched in the private realm.

No attempt was made to legislate the spirit of Islam out of private lives--only its open manifestation. The various reforms did serve to reduce the average Turk's knowledge of the intricacies of his faith--and to some extent the more basic parts of it. The alphabet reform and removal

¹⁴⁸ In small Anatolian villages it is not unusual to find nothing painted except the mosque and the doors and windows of the other buildings--these invariably blue. It is equally common to see new apartment buildings with unpainted walls being 'protected' by blue window and door frames. Cf. Szyliowicz, Erdemli, pp. 104-108, and Mansur, Bodrum, pp. 111-115.

of Arabic from the schools cut at least one entire generation off from any first-hand knowledge of Quranic teachings. This inability to study his religion on his own has left the Turk--especially the peasant Turk--at the mercy of whatever charlatan happens his way. This, in turn, has left Turkish Islam with a folk flavor of some disparity with orthodox Sunni Islam.

Despite this, the average Turk knows he is a Muslim. He will generally state he is a Sunni; but whatever he says, he knows he is a Muslim, and to him, non-Muslims are not Turks.

V. CONCLUSION

Islam is indeed a force in Turkey today. It is no longer the legitimizing force for the state as it was under the early Ottomans, nor is it a political force readily identifiable with a powerful religious elite. Islam in Turkey today is more nearly a subliminal cultural force governing many of the average Turk's day-to-day interpersonal actions.

The secularizing reforms of Atatürk were designed to put an end to the public religious displays which for so many centuries had linked Islam to the state. But the influence of these same centuries' learning at mother's knee the proper way to be a Muslim adult were not and probably could not have been changed.

The overwhelming majority of today's Turks are, at least nominally, Sunni Muslims. The rural Turks tend to be more devout than the urbanites, but the basis for their faith is the same. From a strictly interpreted Sunni viewpoint, most Turks would not qualify as very good Muslims--much traditional superstition has been retained in their religion as practiced in much of the countryside. Atatürk can be accredited with some of this by having cut off the people from formal religious training, but folk Islam had existed in Turkey long before Atatürk.

The process of modernization has accounted for as much personal secularization (probably more) as the many legislated attempts. Improvement in living conditions and communications have produced a desire in the average Turk to further improve his lot in life physically. His belief that being a Muslim is enough to get him to heaven with or without total devotion is enough to cause metaphysics to be left to others. The Turk knows he is a Muslim and that Islam is good--for him, that is enough.

The 'revival' of Islam in Turkish public life was in two phases: the multi-party era when votes were being sought; and the mid-1970's to the present when the object has often been oil. This has been a revival of expediency, but it has underscored the basic fact: Turkey is a nation of Muslims.

The cultural influence of Islam in Turkey is still great and will remain so for generations to come; but what is probably an irreversible process of secularization-by-modernization is well underway. Islam is still important. To be a Turk implies being a Muslim. Many identify quite closely with the remainder of the Muslim World. Still, a higher standard of living and worldly goods have taken over as goals for many Turks today. This notwithstanding, Islamic precepts still govern many of the interpersonal relationships of Turks today--especially the poor.

Islam is not an open political force in Turkey today. It is implied rather than stated; sensed rather than seen in virtually every act. As such, it subconsciously governs the actions of individual Turks and through them very subtly permeates every aspect of Turkish life, and consequently, business and government as well. Islam is indeed a force in Turkey today.

APPENDIX A

ORGANIZATION FOR THE PROMULGATION
OF THE CONSTITUTION OF 1961

On 27 May 1960, the Committee of National Unity assumed control of the government of Turkey in order to relieve the nation from the excesses of the Democratic Party. In order to preclude the recurrence of these excesses upon the return of the government to civilian rule, certain weaknesses in the Constitution of 1924 demanded correction. The method devised for correcting these faults was that of drafting an entirely new constitution.

The vehicle for that drafting was the Constitutional Commission consisting of ten professors from the faculties of the Universities of Istanbul and Ankara. Their work was completed and presented to the CNU on 15 October 1960. There was a second draft prepared independently by the Administrative Sciences Institute of the Faculty of Political Sciences of Ankara University, and it was duly considered along with the former.

The next step in the process was the forming of the Constituent Assembly composed of representatives of the following groups:

- a) Representatives elected by the Head of State and the Committee of National Unity:

- 1 The Head of State
- 2 The Committee of National Unity
- b) Members of the Council of Ministers
- c) Representatives of the Provinces
- d) Representatives of the Political Parties:
 - 1 The Republican People's Party
 - 2 The Republican Peasant Nation Party
- e) Representatives of other organizations and associations:
 - 1 Representatives of the Bars
 - 2 Representatives of the Press
 - 3 Representatives of the Association of Veterans
 - 4 Representatives of the Association of Tradesmen and Craftsmen
 - 5 Representatives of Youth
 - 6 Representatives of the Labor Unions
 - 7 Representatives of the Chambers
 - 8 Representatives of the Teachers' Organizations
 - 9 Representatives of the Agricultural Organizations
 - 10 Representatives of the University
 - 11 Representatives of the Judicial Organs

This Constituent Assembly had the dual charge of discussing and accepting the new constitution as well as preparing a new electoral law. Requirements within the Assembly for acceptance of both documents were set at two-thirds majority, and both the Assembly and the CNU were given the right of a single veto in specific points--if agreement was not reached, a mixed commission was to be formed to settle individual points of dispute.

The Constituent Assembly convened on 6 January 1961 and three days later elected from its membership twenty persons to serve as the Constitutional Commission of the Assembly

of Representatives under the chairmanship of Enver Ziya Karal. This Commission considered both available drafts from 10 January until presenting its draft to the Assembly on 9 March 1961. Debate in the Assembly and CNU went from 30 March until 27 May 1961 when the new Constitution was accepted by votes of 22-0 in the CNU and 238-0 (with thirty-two abstentions) in the Assembly.

The final phase of this process was the popular vote of 9 July 1961. The results were:

...the total number of eligible voters in Turkey was 12.735.009, and a total number of 10.322.169 voters cast their ballots. Of these, 10.282.561 ballots were valid and 39.608 were invalid. The number of those voting for the Constitution totaled 6.348.191 and those against it 3.934.370.

The Constitution of 1961 was put into effect on 20 July 1961.

SOURCE: Kili: pp. 61-67 and 204.

APPENDIX B

ARTICLE 19 OF THE 1961 CONSTITUTION

Every individual is entitled to follow freely the dictates of his conscience, to choose his own religious faith and to have his own opinions.

Forms of worship, and religious ceremonies and rites are free provided they are not in opposition to public order, or morals or to the laws enacted to uphold them.


No person shall be compelled to worship, or participate in religious ceremonies and rites, or to reveal his religious faith and belief. No person shall be reproached for his religious faith and belief.

Religious education and teaching shall be subject to the individual's own will and volition, and in the case of minors, to their legally appointed guardians.

No person shall be allowed to exploit and abuse religion or religious feelings or things considered sacred by religion in any manner whatsoever for the purpose of political or personal benefit, or for gaining power, or for even partially basing the fundamental social, economic, political and legal order of the State on religious dogmas. Those who violate this prohibition, or those who induce others to do so shall be punishable under the pertinent laws. In the case of associations and political parties the former shall be permanently closed down by order of authorized courts and the latter by order of the Constitutional Court.

SOURCE: Kili: Appendix D.

APPENDIX C



LEGEND: • Party founded; — election year for which data is used; (27) percent of vote polled;
 — Party terminated; — primary defection of party members to form new parties.
 (S) Senatorial elections

NOTE: A new party—the "SDP"—appeared in the 1979 senatorial elections about virtually no information has been available in the Turkish press. The SDP polled less than one percent of the total vote with the major portion of its support coming from Istanbul.

SOURCES: Harris, *Origins of Communism*, p 41; Arpat, "Political Developments", p 373; Sabri Sayari, "The Turkish Party System in Transition" in *Government and Opposition*, vol 13, no 1 (Winter 1973) p 42; Sayari, "Aspects of Party Organization in Turkey" in *Middle East Journal*, vol 30 no 2 (Spring 1976), p 187; Shaw and Shaw, *History*, vol 2, pp 380, 382, 406-407; *Hilafet, Hareket and Genelgidi*, 16 October 1979.

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